[^]Arthur C. Guyton. Textbook of Medical Physiology. Sixth edition. W.B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia, 6 edition, 1981 [1956].

[^]George Mandler. Mind and Body. Psychology of Emotion and Stress. W.W. Norton & Company, London/New York, 1984.

[^]Chris Sinha. Language and Representation. A socio-naturalistic approach to human development. Harvester·Wheatsheaf, New York, 1987.

[^]Jan Sleutels. Real knowledge. The problem of content in neural epistemics. PhD thesis, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands, 1994.

[^]On the Internet, at http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg/, you can find most of Steven Grossberg's work

[^]Tadeusz Kotarbiñski. Gnosiologie. The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1966 [1929 & 1961].

[^]Actually I am, in this metaphor, describing the transcendent neuron as a more or less immanent neuron. The more it is a fact that a neuron is activated when the neural network might perceive this or that, the more immanent that neuron actually is. If it is less clear what “this or that” is, then the neuron is more transcendent.

[^]You can find this idea somewhere in James L. McClelland, David E. Rumelhart, and the PDP Research Group. Parallel Distributed Processing. Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Volume 2: Psychological and Biological Models. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1986.

[^]Steven Grossberg in James A. Anderson and Edward Rosenfeld. Talking Nets. An Oral History of Neural Networks. The MIT Press, Cambridge, London, 1998.

[^]I do not at all want to suggest that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a state of the brain and the thing it recognizes. Here I simply want to say: There cannot be infinitely many activation states of our brains at any certain moment, and it is easiest to think of it as being in one state at a time, and if we take the brains as a whole, then this is also exactly the case.

[^]You can find more details to this argument in David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group. Parallel Distributed Processing. Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Volume 1: Foundations. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1986. I shamelessly stole most of my arguments here from them.

[^]For an overview see Stephen Grossberg. The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, (8):1–44, 1999. Preliminary version appears as Boston University Technical Report, CAS/CNS-TR-97-018. On the Internet you can find this work at http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg/

[^]Especially all mathematical examples given in this chapter are taken from: David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group. Parallel Distributed Processing. Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Volume 1: Foundations. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1986.

[^]James A. Anderson and Edward Rosenfeld. Talking Nets. An Oral History of Neural Networks. The MIT Press, Cambridge, London, 1998.

[^]David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group. Parallel Distributed Processing. Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Volume 1: Foundations, pages 318-362. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1986.

[^]James L. McClelland, David E. Rumelhart, and the PDP Research Group. Parallel Distributed Processing. Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Volume 2: Psychological and Biological Models. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1986.

[^]On the other hand, the transcendent, deconstructing neural network is the network which immanizes and abstracts what is being perceived through the senses, while the immanent, constructing neural network gives concrete, that is, with regard to our consciousness, transcendent, form to where our attention lets us be. So, the transcendent network is the immanizing network and the immanent network is the transcending network.

[^]This is not necessarily, nor even usually, and certainly never exactly, a copy of the ’real’ construction which we are attending to in the outside world, neither is it that which we are imagining, but it is a deconstruction or construction nevertheless.

[^]It might be that other neurons around the main neuron in the highest neural level are activated by the attention mechanism too, but the mechanism must have a certain precision.

[^]My guess is that in our own brains, this is implemented exactly the other way round. I think that the attention mechanism allows only a few neurons in the highest level of the deconstructing neural network to become activated. This is, by way of mirroring, transferred to the constructing neural network.

[^]Stephen Grossberg. The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, (8):1–44, 1999. Preliminary version appears as Boston University Technical Report, CAS/CNS-TR-97-018. On the Internet you can find this work at http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg/

[^]It may be a bit misleading to speak of “teaching input” here, since I do not assume the neural network to have back-propagation in the way most mathematical models have. However, my aim here is not to prove anything but to establish meaningful images.

[^]Anthony Giddens. New Rules of sociological method. Hutchinson & Co, London, 1960.

[^]Jacques M. Lacan. Écrits, A Selection. W.W. Norton & Company, New York/London, 1977 [1966]. First, French edition is from éditions du Seuil (1966).

[^]If true then mirroring takes place at the level of neural levels. If one would believe there to be a neural hierarchy within a cortical area, with hidden neurons, and so on, then this would be quite distinct from continuous mirroring. In that case there would, further more, need to be mirroring, or some other, unknown mechanism, at a smaller scale too, in order to train the hidden neurons within cortical areas. It is, however, highly unlikely for this extra hierarchy to exist for the simple reason that biological neurons are much too slow for so much hierarchy – disregarding non-linearities within neurons, which would be beneficial.

[^]See Stephen M. Kosslyn. Image and Brain: the resolution of the imagery debate. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1994.

[^]The prototypes will have to be distinguished first, of course. So before the sensory information is indistinguishable.

[^]Tadeusz Kotarbiñski. Gnosiologie. The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1966 [1929 & 1961]. A ‘perceptual image’ is also named a ‘direct image’ by Kotarbiñski. In analogy, reproductive and productive images can be called ‘indirect images.’ Kotarbiñski named images such, because with regard to our senses the latter are formed indirect and the former direct. His perspective was, unlike mine, from outside a person. A perceptual image, for instance, is, from the perspective of the attention mechanism, formed indirectly. Therefore I shall avoid using these words. To make it even more complex Kotarbiñski distinguished between, on the one hand, direct transcendent images, productive transcendent images, and reproductive transcendent images, and, on the other hand, between direct immanent images, productive immanent images, and reproductive immanent images. These distinctions are comparable to mine, but I do not mention transcendent images very often. By the way, in practice an image is always both direct and indirect, but for the purpose of analysis this distinction between direct and indirect is very convenient.

[^]Jacques M. Lacan. The four fundamental concepts of psycho-analysis. Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, 1977 [1973].

[^]Edward De Bono. The mechanism of Mind. Penguin Books, London, 1971 [1969].

[^]George Mandler. Mind and Body. Psychology of Emotion and Stress. W.W. Norton & Company, London/New York, 1984.

[^]Anthony Giddens. New Rules of sociological method. Hutchinson & Co, London, 1960.

[^]Jacques M. Lacan. Écrits, A Selection. W.W. Norton & Company, New York/London, 1977 [1966]. First, French edition is from éditions du Seuil (1966).

[^]The concept of a programming language, from a mathematical point of view, is that it is something which is capable of calculating partially recursive functions. So, if I say that an image is like a function, then my machinery is a computer program, though not every computer program will behave like my machinery, of course. For a long time this seemed to me far out of odds. But if I consider that an ordinary computer uses, from moment to moment at least, many, relatively simple functions for a certain task, while our brains do the same with one, or a few, big, and complex functions, and further more, of course, that our brains have inborn, self-programming mechanisms, then I see no conflict in principle anymore. This said, I still do not really see how the idea of a computer program could help to gain an understanding of the working of our brains.

[^]Strictly speaking this statement may not hold for every conceivable network, but in that case I claim that, in theory, there are redundant neurons – this might be beneficial in case a neuron dies, of course. Actually such a statement requires mathematical proof, of course. I take it for a fact.

[^]Another idea would be to speak of family-structure, as Wittgenstein did. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1945. Philosophische Untersuchungen, Teil I. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. (In English: 1953. Philosophial Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell)

[^]The terms “endostructure” and “exostructure” I took from Chris Sinha. 1987. Language and Representation. A socio-naturalistic approach to human development.

[^]Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1945. Philosophische Untersuchungen, Teil I. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. (In English: 1953. Philosophial Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell)

[^]See Kosslyn, Stephen M., 1994. Image and Brain: the resolution of the imagery debate. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: The MIT Press.

[^]Jacques M. Lacan. 1977 [1966]. Écrits, A Selection. New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company.

[^]Whorf, B.L. 1956. The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language. in Whorf, B.L. Language, thought and reality. Page 58-67. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.

[^]Here I am referring to the post-modern philosophy of Jean-François Lyotard. See: Jean-François Lyotard. 1979. Het postmoderne weten: een verslag. Kampen: Kok Agora.

[^]Michael Billig and/or John Shotter must have written about this, but I don’t know any titles

[^]From this comes the mathematical idea that any intelligence can be seen as a form of information processing. See Howard Rheingold, Tools for Thought, MIT Press (on the Internet at http://www.rheingold.com/texts/tft/)

[^]Tadeusz Kotarbiñski, 1966 [1929 and 1961], Gnosiology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, Oxford: Pergamon Press.

[^]Charles Sanders Peirce in his sign-typology made a number of distinctions which in my system are subjective. The ground of all of them is, what Peirce calls, a Legisign. The (rhematic) Iconic Legisign (e.g. we hear someone speaking in a language which we recognize as a language but which we do not understand), the rhematic indexical Legisign (e.g. deictic words like ‘here,’ and ‘now’), and the dicent indexical Legisign (e.g. someone calling something) are things most mammals will understand too, mostly through their planning mechanism. Specifically human are the following Legisigns: the rhematic symbol (e.g. a word without any context, that is our lexicon), the dicent symbol (e.g. an ordinary proposition), and an Argument (symbolic and Legisign).

[^]Other than Kotarbiñski I attribute the terms ‘immanent’ and ‘transcendent’ also to subjective, objective, energetic and material images. Kotarbiñski nowhere speaks of transcendent or immanent images. He only speaks of transcendent or immanent interpretations of images, objects of images and content of images. To make it even more complex, in his story this is always an interpretation of an interpretation. Nevertheless I think that my interpretation of his interpretation of an interpretation is correct. In fact I largely say the same through my idea of chain reference, which in fact is interpretation of interpretations, and it is also equal to the process of semiosis as defined by Charles Sanders Peirce.

[^]C.J.M. Schuyt. 1982/3. Het pragmatisme van Charles Sanders Peirce. Kennis en methode.

[^]Guyton, Arthur C. 1981 [1956]. Textbook of Medical Physiology. Sixth edition. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company.

Gerard J. Tortora. 1980. Principles of Human Anatomy. New York: Harper & Row.

[^]There are options ‘in between.’ Athletes often do ‘imagine’ a game they have to play just before they go into it, and they do feel this in their muscles.

[^]I do hold open the possibility that we might achieve some true motor imagination through special meditation.

[^]Highly intelligent people who tend to become psychotic, might have been helped by meditation and rigorous and rational checks on their thoughts. Other highly intelligent people seem to do the opposite, being very neurotic about their environment, holding on to thoughts that should be abandoned. The solution might be equal. Especially in our individual society intelligence is something which we have to deal with, if we have a lot of it.

[^]In searching for the literature about this I found a book by K. Elam: “The semiotics of theater and drama.” (1980). I’ve read some of it many years ago. Much to my surprise I found in it both a Czech word for foregrounding, “aktualisace,” which was at first used to describe the foregrounding of the language itself in poetry, and a Russian one, “ostranenie,” which means ‘making strange’ (page 17/18) – that is, by the way, a method of foregrounding often used by Bertold Brecht in his theater work. Elam also writes, for instance: “From the first, the Prague theorists – following Otakar Zich, conceived of the performance structure as a dynamic hierarchy of elements” (page 16). Prague theorists also emphasized, for instance, “the transformability of the hierarchical order” (Honzl 1940, p.20). The Russian word comes from Russian Formalists. It is through these two groups that the ideas of De Saussure found, through the work of Levi-Strauss, their way into anthropology. I read that Jan Mukarovskÿ, a leading Prague structuralist, analyzed movies made by Charlie Chaplin in 1931, which I did too, 50 years later, in one of my Dutch writings, to prove my point.

[^]James W. Fernandez. 1986. Persuasions and Performances. The Play of Tropes in Culture. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.